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The principle of systemic integration is being expounded as the answer to 
certain difficulties arising from the fragmentation of public international law (PIL), in 
a similar vein to the way that ‘number 42’ was the ultimate answer to everything in the 
universe in the novel, ‘The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy’.1 International lawyers 
and judges contemplate and discuss systemic integration without, however, explaining 
the application of this principle of interpretation in legal reasoning. This article makes 
two arguments: First, the uncritical application of systemic integration raises serious 
interpretational and jurisdictional concerns. Second, systemic integration does not 
necessarily yield the results hoped for, but may instead create new hegemonies among 
international courts and give rise to a poorer and less diverse international law in the 
future.  
The article focuses on the application of systemic integration of treaties – more 
specifically, in the human rights area. Although the function of systemic integration has 
been explored across different functional regimes (e.g. trade law or investment law vis-
à-vis human rights), not much has been written concerning the human rights regime 
itself. The analysis discusses the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) and the African Court 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR). The study of the application of systemic 
integration in human rights law draws lessons for the development of human rights law 
and international law. International human rights courts are particularly inclined to 
apply this principle of interpretation. Although human rights treaties are not inherently 
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different vis-à-vis other treaties, they are drafted in a distinctively open textured manner 
which makes them conducive to further development. Moreover, permanent 
international courts on human rights engage with international law questions, including 
interpretative issues, on a regular basis and, hence, are bound to reflect on and refine 
their approaches in a more systematic way than other international courts.2 Therefore, 
their case law should provide a useful understanding of the difficulties arising from the 
application of systemic integration and lessons to be learned by international law, in 
general. Finally, the human rights regime evidences a certain propensity toward 
innovation often in terms of addressing how human rights law can include and articulate 
other interests (human rights-related or not) under international law. Systemic 
integration is used as the interpretative means (and justification) for international courts 
to engage in this exercise. The analysis demonstrates the rarely discussed implications 
of this exercise to the progressive development of international law. 
The question of the fragmentation of PIL has been at the forefront over the last 
decade. The diversification and expansion of the scope of PIL, and the proliferation of 
international bodies exercising (semi-) judicial functions, have increased the likelihood 
of conflicting or diverging interpretations of similar or identical rules.3 Interpretation is 
considered to be the main approach for mitigating such difficulties.4 A treaty shall be 
construed, as far as possible, in consistency with other PIL rules. Article 31 (3)(c) 
VCLT is of interest in this regard, since it specifically points out that a treaty shall be 
interpreted by taking into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties. 
Fragmentation of PIL, however, does not concern only the risk of divergences 
among international courts. The discussion is underpinned by an equally important 
concern: due to their limited jurisdiction, international courts are unable to grasp, and 
respond holistically (and therefore effectively) to, global legal problems. International 
courts decide the cases brought before them in a “piecemeal” fashion by ‘squeezing’;5 
																																								 																				
2 P Webb, International Judicial Integration and Fragmentation (OUP, 2013) 157. 
3 International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission finalised by M Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (ILC Final Rep). 
4 ILC Final Rep (n 3) [34]-[37]; MT Kamminga, ‘Final Report on the Impact of International Human 
Rights Law on General International Law’ in MT Kamminga and M Scheinin (eds), The Impact of 
Human Rights on General International Law (OUP, 2009) 1-2. 
5 Sir F Berman, ‘Treaty Interpretation in a Judicial Context’ (2004) 29 Yale JIL 315.  
The Principle of Systemic Integration in Human Rights Law	 3	
or reducing the dispute to fit the court’s competence.6 An international court is 
competent to decide a case insofar as the subject matter of the dispute falls within the 
scope of the treaty under discussion.7 A case will not be heard in all of its international 
law relevant aspects, and a given international court is not entitled to resolve the dispute 
itself; the court is mandated to decide the dispute pursuant to its jurisdiction and 
applicable law.8 The widening and enrichment of PIL, coupled with the proliferation of 
international bodies, has emphasised these disparities in PIL – and the fact that PIL 
itself is, to a great extent, fragmented. Similar or even identical rights and obligations 
under different treaties retain their separate existence, notwithstanding the treaties’ 
respective contexts, their objects and purposes, the subsequent practice of parties and 
preparatory work.9 It follows that it is an inherent feature of any international court’s 
judicial function to decide a case brought before it through the lens of its jurisdiction.  
Against this background, systemic integration is being presented not only as a 
means to avoid dissonant interpretations and/or judgments, but also as a remedy for the 
“piecemeal” judicial function of international courts. The International Law 
Commission (ILC), in its work on fragmentation, is leading the way in asserting that 
systemic integration is the process whereby international treaty obligations are 
interpreted by reference to their normative environment, so that, consequently, treaties 
appear as parts of a coherent and meaningful whole. In this sense, systemic integration 
goes further than stating the applicability of general international law in the operation 
of treaties. It specifically points to the need to interpret one treaty by reference to 
another treaty, with the objective of ‘connect[ing] the separate treaty provisions […] as 
aspects of an overall aggregate of the rights and obligations of the States’.10 This is 
arguably the most obscure aspect of systemic integration. Whereas, in general, taking 
other treaties into account when interpreting a treaty is part of the international lawyer’s 
mindset and enhances consistency in PIL,11 it is unclear what it means to set the 
objective to systemically integrate one treaty into another in order to achieve ‘a sense 
																																								 																				
6 Sir R Jennings, ‘Reflections on the Term “Dispute”’ in R StJ Macdonald (ed), Essays in Honour of 
Wang Tieya (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1994) 403. 
7 L Caflisch, ‘The Law – Substantive and Procedural Questions’ (2008) 7 The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals 294. 
8 Webb (n 2) 158, 162. 
9 International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Mox Plant (Ireland v UK) Provisional Measures, 3 
December 2001 (2002) 41 ILM 405 [51] (emphases added). 
10 ILC Final Rep (n 3) [467], [413]-[415]. 
11 European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WTO 
Panel Report, WT/DS291R, WT/DS292R/WT/DS293, 29 September 2006 [7.70]. 
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of coherence and meaningfulness’.12 Many scholars have endorsed the ILC’s approach 
and, moreover, they posit that Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT may be taken to express the 
principle of systemic integration.13  
This article’s starting point is that the principle of systemic integration should not 
be equated to Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT. It argues that the principle of systemic 
integration14 – either allegedly derived from Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT or as a stand-alone 
principle – cannot remedy the international courts’ fragmented lens.15 The purpose of 
interpretation is not to integrate treaties into a coherent whole, but to introduce any 
relevant rules in the process of a treaty’s interpretation and to offer interpretative 
guidance (Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT being one means to do so).16 Part II of the article 
demonstrates that the application of systemic integration in many cases finds its place 
outside the realm of interpretation and raises serious jurisdictional concerns regarding 
the mandate of international courts. The crucial questions in legal reasoning with regard 
to pursuing systemic integration concern the degree to which other treaties will be 
relevant and the weight that will be attached to it in informing the interpretation of a 
given treaty.17  
Part III turns to explore the reasons that systemic integration of treaties falls 
short of international lawyers’ expectations. It submits that the principle is still shaped 
by – and possibly reinforces – existing institutional preferences and biases, and that it 
																																								 																				
12 ILC Final Rep (n 3) [419]. 
13 ibid [410]-[460]; C McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31 (3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 279; J d’Aspremont, ‘The Systemic Integration of International 
Law by Domestic Courts: Domestic Judges as Architects of the Consistency of the International Legal 
Order’ in A Nollkaemper and OK Fauchald (eds), The Practice of International and National Courts and 
the (De-) Fragmentation of International Law (Hart Publishing, 2012) 141. Also, M Forowicz, The 
Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights (OUP, 2010) 13; R Nordeide, 
‘The ECHR and its Normative Environment: Difficulties Arising from a Regional Human Rights Court’s 
Approach to Systemic Integration’ in Nollkaemper and Fauchald above, 131. P Merkouris, Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration (Brill-Nijhoff, 2015). 
14 The ILC Final Rep (n 3) [473]-[474]; McLachlan (n 13) 280; and Merkouris (n 13) equate the principle 
of systemic integration to Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT. Cf. B Simma and T Kill, ‘Harmonising Investment 
Protection and International Human Rights: First Steps towards A Methodology’ in C Binder et al. (eds), 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century (OUP, 2009) 678; R Higgins, ‘A Babel of Judicial 
Voices? Ruminations From the Bench’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 791; D French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the 
Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 281; Webb (n 2); I van Damme, Treaty 
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (OUP, 2009); M Samson, ‘High Hopes, Scant Resources: A 
Word of Skepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties’ (2011) 24 LJIL 701; VP Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(C) of the VCLT 
in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-Fragmentation Tool or a Selective Loophole for the 
Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology?’ (2010) 31 Michigan JIL 621. 
15 McLachlan (n 13) 288. 
16 Samson (n 14) 710-713; Simma and Kill (n 14) 692-694; Webb (n 2) 5; van Damme (n 14) 365. R 
Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (2nd edn, OUP, 2015) 327.  
17 ILC Final Rep (n 3) [419], [435]-[438], [473]-[474]; McLachlan (n 13) 310; Gardiner (n 16) 327. 
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cannot serve as a tool to prioritise among important concerns either. Furthermore, 
systemic integration in human rights law does not necessarily always benefit the 
diversity of PIL, but, on the contrary, may hinder its progressive development. In an 
effort to create coherence, one runs the risk of reducing the existing or potential reach 
of PIL to the restricted vocabulary and structure of the human rights paradigm. 
Systemic integration fuels the phenomenon of exercising undue interpretative authority 
over other treaties, as well as raising the possibility of the emergence of new informal 
hegemonies among international courts. The analysis concludes that, despite the 
appealing nature of the principle of systemic integration, international courts and bodies 
should exercise caution.  
 
II. INTERPRETATIONAL AND JURISDICTIONAL CONCERNS  
This part of the article highlights the limits to the application of the principle of 
systemic integration when interpreting a given treaty. Three principal issues arise when 
the interpreter loses sight of the appropriate weight that should be attached to other 
treaties in order to inform the construal of the treaty under interpretation. First, systemic 
integration of treaties may lead the interpreter to disregard the textual limits set forth 
by the treaty under interpretation. Second, systemic integration can foster the risk of 
downplaying the contextual nuances between different treaties. Third, uncritically 
employing systemic integration may result in the indirect application and supervision 
of other treaties under the guise of interpretation, thereby raising serious implications 
for the court’s mandates and legitimacy.  
 
A. Disregarding the Textual Limits of the Treaty Under Interpretation   
The obvious limit to applying systemic integration, as is the case with any 
interpretation principle, is the explicit letter of the treaty under interpretation.18 The 
weight accorded to other treaty provisions, and their impact on the construal of the said 
treaty, cannot lead to an interpretation that goes beyond its explicit text. There are 
instances, however, in which reliance upon other treaties drives an interpretation that 
distorts the language of a human rights treaty. 
In the Zolotukhin case, the applicant alleged a violation of Article 4 of 
Additional Protocol 7 (Article 4 of AP7) to the European Convention on Human Rights 
																																								 																				
18 Pretty v United Kingdom, 29 April 2002 [39]. 
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(ECHR),19 complaining that he had been prosecuted twice for the same offence.20 
Article 4 of AP 7 reads, ‘No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal 
proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has 
already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal 
procedure of the State’. The Court’s position at that point was that the term ‘offence’ 
should be understood by reference to the legal classification under national law. Hence, 
if an act was classified as two distinct criminal offences under municipal law, the 
prohibition under Article 4 of AP 7 would not apply. The Grand Chamber revisited the 
definition of the term ‘offence’ by finding recourse to similarly drafted treaty provisions 
envisaging formulations of the ne bis in idem principle. Reference was made to the 
respective provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR);21 the Statute of the International Criminal Court;22 the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter);23 the Convention 
Implementing the Schengen Agreement;24 and the Inter-American Convention on 
Human Rights (IACHR).25 Article 14 (7) ICCPR and Article 50 EU Charter contain the 
term ‘offence’, Article 8 (4) IACHR refers to ‘cause’, Article 54 of the Schengen 
Agreement mentions ‘acts’ and Article 20 (1) ICC Statute refers to ‘conduct’. The Court 
emphasised that the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) and the IACtHR followed the most favourable approach to the individual and 
that, for this reason, it could not ‘justify adhering to a more restrictive approach’26 than 
the one followed by the CJEU and the IACtHR. The Grand Chamber unanimously 
overruled its previous case law and dramatically altered the scope of applicability of 
Article 4 AP 7. 
The driving force behind the Court’s reasoning was the construal of the ECHR 
in light of relevant treaties and the Court’s willingness to align its position with the 
jurisprudence of other international courts. Nonetheless, the strong inferences drawn 
																																								 																				
19 (Concluded 4 November 1950; entered into force 3 September 1953) ETS 5. 
20 Sergey Zolotukhin v Russia, 10 February 2009 (Grand Chamber). 
21 (Adopted 16 December 1966; entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
22 (Concluded 17 July 1998; entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90. 
23 Official Journal of the European Communities, 18.12.2000, C 364/1. 
24 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual 
Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders (concluded 14 June 1985; entered into force 19 June 
1990). 
25 (Concluded 21 November 1969; entered into force 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series No 36. 
26 Zolotukhin [80]. 
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by the jurisprudence of the CJEU and the IACtHR on the pretext of the most favourable 
interpretation for the individual are ill founded. This is because the rulings of the two 
international courts develop the Schengen Agreement and the IACHR respectively, 
which encapsulate the ne bis in idem prohibition in broader terms to the ECHR.27 
Ironically, the ECtHR relied upon this practice in order to provide a broad definition to 
the specific and restricted term ‘offence’ under Article 4 of AP 7. The Grand Chamber 
afforded such great weight to these treaties that it effectively disregarded the textual 
limits of the ECHR. It is doubtful whether, as has been argued, this judgment is a 
positive example of constructive dialogue among international courts or an opportunity 
to fill in gaps.28 The Grand Chamber in the Mamatkulov and Askarov and Scoppola 
cases overruled its previous jurisprudence by disregarding the limits set forth by the 
ECHR in a similar fashion.29  
Likewise, the IACtHR in Artavia Murillo et al. – a case concerning in vitro 
fertilisation and the question of whether Article 4 IACHR protects the right to life of 
the embryo – pursued a construal of the IACHR that went against its letter. Even though 
Article 4 (1) provides that ‘[the right to life] shall be protected by law and, in general, 
from the moment of conception’, the Court ruled that the embryo cannot be understood 
to be a person for the purposes of Article 4.30 A forceful argument for reaching this 
conclusion was that trends in international law do not support the position that the 
embryo should be treated in the same way as a person, or that it has a right to life.31 The 
Court pursued the systematic interpretation of the IACHR by taking other treaties and 
instruments into account as well as the practice of human rights bodies,32 including the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights;33 the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)34 and the views of the CEDAW 
																																								 																				
27 ibid [36]-[38], [40].  
28 Cf. Forowicz (n 13) 360-1; T Treves, ‘Judicial Lawmaking in an Era of “Proliferation” of International 
Courts and Tribunals: Development or Fragmentation of International Law?’ in R Wolfrum and V Röben 
(eds), Developments of International Law in Treaty-Making (Springer, 2005) 614-5. 
29 Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey, 4 February 2005 (Grand Chamber) [109]-[113], [123]-[125]. 
Scoppola v Italy (No 2), 17 September 2009 (Grand Chamber) [96]-[110]; cf. Partly Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Nicolaou joined by Judges Bratza, Lorenzen, Jočiené, Villiger and Sajó in Scoppola, 44-7.  
30Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v Costa Rica, IACtHR Series C 257 (2012) [264] (emphases 
added). 
31 ibid [253]. 
32 ibid [224]-[244]. 
33 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Res 217 A (III) (10 December 1948). 
34 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (concluded 18 
December 1979; entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
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Committee; the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC);35 the ICCPR and the 
practice of the Human Rights Committee (HRC); the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights (ACHPR);36 and, finally, the ECHR and case law of the ECtHR. 
However, this was an inappropriate application of systemic integration, not only 
because many of these treaties do not bind the member states to the IACHR37 but also, 
most importantly, because none of these treaties explicitly protect unborn life. Article 
4 IACHR is a unique formulation of the right to life in international human rights law 
and, hence, it is questionable how other (general) treaties and instruments shed light on 
its interpretation. The Court’s problematic line of reasoning is illustrated by its 
reference to the Vo. v France case, in which the ECtHR highlighted that ‘unlike Article 
4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, which provides that the right to life 
must be protected “in general, from the moment of conception”, Article 2 of the 
Convention is silent as to the temporal limitations of the right to life […]’.38 
Most international human rights treaties are able to accommodate change 
through time due to their vaguely drafted text, affording considerable leeway to the 
interpreter. Yet, the interpreter cannot pursue a construal of the treaty that qualifies as 
a revision of the text.39 In the foregoing cases the ECtHR and the IACtHR seem to have 
crossed that line.  
 
B. Duly Appreciating the Contextual Nuances between Different Treaties? 
International courts and bodies have an extensive case law drawing synergies 
and links between the treaty that they interpret and apply and other treaties. This 
practice is welcome and attuned to the goal of pursuing coherence in PIL. Nonetheless, 
taking account of norms that are similar or identical to those in the treaty under 
interpretation is subject to pertinent contextual nuances pertaining to the purpose, 
function and aims of the other treaty provisions.40 In order for the interpreter to 
																																								 																				
35 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted by UNGA Res. 44/25 (20 November 1989) UN Doc 
A/RES/44/25; entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3. 
36 (Adopted 27 June 1981; entered into force 21 October 2001) 1520 UNTS 217. 
37 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi in Artavia Murillo et al. 113, 128; LM De Jesús, ‘A 
Pro-choice Reading of a Pro-life Treaty: The Inter-American Court on Human Rights’ Distorted 
Interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights in Artavia v. Costa Rica’ (2014) 32 
Wisconsin ILJ 250-2. 
38 Vo. v France, 8 July 2004 (Grand Chamber) [75] (emphases added). See Dissenting Opinion of Judge 
Eduardo Vio Grossi in Artavia Murillo et al. 113. 
39 Human Rights Committee, Atasoy and Sarkut v Turkey, Communication Nos 1853/2008 and 
1854/2008, UN Doc CCPR/C/104/D/1854-1854/2008, 29 March 2012 [7.13]. 
40 Mox Plant (n 9); Permanent Court of Arbitration, Access to Information under Article 9 of the OSPAR 
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ascertain and give due regard to such nuances, he/she needs to not only identify the core 
of similarity among equivalent41 treaty provisions but also appreciate the differences 
between them. The question is, therefore, whether international courts meaningfully 
engage with another treaty so as to value the different context from which these 
provisions originate. It is important that the international judge examines and explains 
how that treaty is relevant and, accordingly, how it informs the construal of the treaty 
under interpretation. This section argues that such nuances are easily disregarded.  
The Van der Mussele and Siliadin cases exemplify how the ECtHR should give 
consideration to other treaties while preserving the ECHR’s specificity.42 In Van der 
Mussele, the applicant alleged a violation of the prohibition on forced or compulsory 
labour under Article 4 (2) ECHR. The Plenary Court had recourse to the 1932 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labour43 and the 1959 ILO Convention on the Abolition of Forced 
Labour.44 The definition of forced or compulsory labour contained in ILO Convention 
No 29 and the standards adopted by the ILO Committee of Experts45 had an informative 
impact on the construction of Article 4 ECHR. The Court underlined that the ILO 
Convention will provide the ‘starting point for the interpretation of Article 4’,46 but that 
‘sight should not be lost of [the European] Convention’s special features’.47 The 
question as to whether the applicant unwillingly offered his services was not assessed 
against the formal ILO approach to the meaning of consent48 but against the structure 
and the aims of Article 4 ECHR. Hence, the ECtHR neither employed an unqualified 
reliance on, nor integrated, ILO Convention No 29. Likewise, in the Siliadin case, the 
ECtHR took cognisance of the ILO Convention No 29 to define ‘forced or compulsory 
labour’, according to which the work or service has to be extracted by an individual 
																																								 																				
Convention (Ireland v UK), Final Award, 2 July 2003, 42 ILM 1118 [142].  
41 Broude and Shany use the term ‘equivalent’ to denote norms that are identical or similar in their 
normative context and have been established through different instruments, or are applicable in different 
substantive areas of law, in T Broude and Y Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced 
Equivalent Norms’ in T Broude and Y Shany (eds), Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International 
Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 5, 9. 
42 Van der Mussele v Belgium, 23 November 1983 (Plenary). 
43 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, C29 (concluded 28 June 1930; entered into 
force 1 May 1932) 39 UNTS 55 (ILO Convention No 29). 
44 Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, C105 (concluded 25 June 1957; entered into 
force 17 January 1959) 320 UNTS 291 (ILO Convention No 105).  
45 ‘Abolition of Forced Labour’: General Survey by the Committee of Experts on Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations, 1979. 
46 Van der Mussele [32] (emphases added).  
47 ibid. 
48 ibid [37]. 
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under the menace of penalty. Although the applicant in these specific circumstances 
had not been threatened by a penalty, the Court found that she was in an equivalent 
situation due to her vulnerable position.49 In this way, the Court, in light of the specific 
facts, equated the ILO standard of being threatened by a menace of penalty to 
perceiving to be threatened by a penalty. 
In contrast, in other instances the ECtHR drew interpretative guidance from 
other treaties while ignoring contextual differences and uncritically transposing 
detailed standards into the ECHR’s scope. In the National Union of Rail, Maritime and 
Transport Workers case, the Court held that the Convention protects sympathy strikes. 
It employed a series of relevant international treaties and practice in its legal reasoning, 
but it failed to examine exactly how these norms were relevant and how they aided the 
interpretation of Article 11 ECHR.50 The Court stressed that the ILO Committee of 
Experts and the Committee on Freedom of Association supported in their views the 
assertion that a general prohibition of sympathy strikes violates the right to strike, even 
though these bodies simply mentioned that a general ban could lead to abuse in light of 
the specific circumstances.51 Further, the restrictions set forth to the right to strike, as 
envisaged in the EU Charter, were not sufficiently addressed. Finally, the Court heavily 
relied upon Article 6 of the European Social Charter (ESC),52 without acknowledging 
that most of Article 6’s undertakings are optional and that ten European states have 
chosen not to guarantee the right to strike under the ESC. 
The expansive interpretation of the ECHR in the National Union of Rail, 
Maritime and Transport Workers case follows up the Court’s approach in the area of 
socio-economic rights. In Demir and Baykara, the Grand Chamber accepted that the 
right of public officials to form and join a trade union and to bargain collectively has 
become one of the essential elements of Article 11 ECHR.53 This judgment also paved 
the way for recognising the right to strike and the right to collective action under Article 
11.54 The legal reasoning in these cases was underpinned by consideration of the ILO 
																																								 																				
49 Siliadin v France, 26 July 2005 [118]. 
50 National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v United Kingdom, 8 April 2014 [26]-[37], 
[76], [84]-[104]; cf. Concurring Opinion of Judge Wojtyczek, 47-9. 
51 V Velyvyte, ‘The Right to Strike in the European Union after Accession to the European Convention 
on Human Rights: Identifying Conflict and Achieving Coherence’ (2015) 15 HRLR 80. 
52 European Social Charter (revised) (concluded 3 May 1996; entered into force 1 July 1999) CETS No 
163. 
53 Demir and Baykara, 12 November 2008 (Grand Chamber) [65]-[86], [153]-[154]. 
54 Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen v Turkey, 21 April 2009 [16], [24], [31]; Danilenkov and Others v Russia, 30 July 
2009 [102]-[108], [123].  
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Conventions and the ESC as well as their progressive development by their respective 
monitoring bodies. The judgments share the same methodology: namely, discerning an 
alleged common denominator by reference to a great variety of treaties. One could 
argue that this so-called integrated approach to the interpretation of the ECHR seeks to 
integrate socio-economic rights into the construal of individual and political rights, and 
that it is founded upon the ideas of cross-fertilisation and convergence among different 
treaties.55 Yet the ideas of cross-fertilisation or convergence of treaty norms cannot 
justify the transplantation of detailed treaty provisions into the scope of the ECHR.  
Another example demonstrating how the ECtHR pursues systemic integration 
by ignoring crucial contextual differences is the Opuz case. The applicant claimed a 
breach of Article 2 due to the lack of a deterrent effect in Turkish legislation, since 
perpetrators of domestic violence could not be prosecuted if the victim withdrew her 
complaint. Despite the clear absence of consensus among member states on this matter, 
the Court ruled that states have the positive obligation under the ECHR to establish and 
effectively apply a system punishing all forms of domestic violence, and to provide 
sufficient safeguards for the victims.56 This conclusion was reasoned by invoking the 
due diligence standard as a yardstick for assessing state responsibility in the context of 
violence against women.57 In the process of discerning a common denominator by 
taking a series of treaties and international practice into account, the ECtHR detached 
the different variants of the due diligence standard from their treaty contexts. More 
specifically, the Court drew upon General Recommendation 19 issued by the CEDAW 
Committee and the Committee’s views in individual communications, including the 
A.T. v Hungary case.58 A careful reading of A.T. reveals that the CEDAW Committee 
did not explicitly refer to a failure to exercise due diligence.59 The ECtHR also devoted 
special attention to the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women, which was the only treaty in force (at the time) 
																																								 																				
55 V Mantouvalou, ‘Labour Rights in the European Convention on Human Rights: An Intellectual 
Justification for an Integrated Approach to Interpretation’ (2013) 13 HRLR 538; cf. H Cullen, ‘The 
Collective Complaints System of the European Social Charter: Interpretative Methods of the European 
Committee of Social Rights’ (2009) 9 HRLR 72. 
56 Opuz v Turkey, 9 June 2009 [87]-[90], [138], [145].  
57 UNGA Res 48/104, ‘Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women’ (20 December 1993) 
UN Doc A/RES/48/104. 
58A.T. v Hungary, CEDAW Committee,  
Communication No 2/2003, 26 January 2005; Fatma Yildirim v Austria, CEDAW Committee, 
Communication No 6/2005, 6 August 2007. 
59 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, its Causes and Consequences (20 
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addressing violence against women,60 and the practice of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR). In the Maria Da Penha v Brazil case, the 
IACmHR held that states must exercise due diligence by preventing and investigating 
domestic violence incidents.61 The ECtHR, however, did not read this case with the 
caveat in mind that the IACmHR employed the due diligence standard by ascertaining 
jurisdiction over, and applying, the specialised Belem Convention (and not the 
IACHR).62  
In Lohe Issa Konate v Burkina Faso, the question before the African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights was whether the harsh criminal penalties levied by Burkina 
Faso against the applicant, on charges of defamation, represented a disproportionate 
interference with his right to freedom of expression under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.63 A specific feature of the right to freedom of expression, 
and other rights envisaged in the ACHPR, is that they are subject to the so-called 
clawback clauses.64 According to Article 9 (2), ‘Every individual shall have the right 
to express and disseminate his opinions within the law’. The idea behind subjecting the 
right of freedom of expression to the limits of domestic law is to give considerable 
leeway to member states. The Court, however, held that the phrase ‘within the law’ 
must be interpreted in reference to international standards.65 It based its reasoning on a 
consideration of Article 19 ICCPR and the views of the HRC (and the African 
Commission’s practice).66 Although this is, in principle, a welcome development in the 
context of a growing convergence among international courts when interpreting 
limitation and clawback clauses,67 it is not entirely clear to what extent other treaties 
may be used in this regard. The ICCPR, the IACHR and the ECHR do not contain 
similar clauses and, therefore, one might question whether they can be used to 
“neutralise” these clauses in the ACHPR. In fact, the only similar human rights treaty 
																																								 																				
60 Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women (concluded 9 June 1994; entered into force 5 March 1995) (1994) 33 ILM 1534 (Belem 
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61 Maria Da Penha v Brazil, Report No 54/01 [55], [56]. 
62 ibid [60]. 
63 Lohe Issa Konate v Burkina Faso, ACtHPR App No 004/2013 (2014) [164], [176]. 
64 CA Odinkalu, ‘Implementing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights under the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in MD Evans and R Murray (eds), The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (CUP, 2002) 195. 
65 Lohe Issa Konate [125]-[131]. 
66 ibid [128]-[129]. 
67 D Shelton, ‘International Decisions’ (2015) 109 AJIL 635. 
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is the Revised Arab Charter,68 which prescribes clawback clauses to many of the rights 
provided therein, but the ACtHPR made no mention of it. The Vice-President of the 
Court, in a separate opinion attached to another case, pointed out this problematic issue, 
but concluded, with no further explanation, that the ACHPR should be interpreted in 
the same spirit as the ICCPR.69 
The IACtHR, for its part, does not elaborate on any contextual differences 
between treaties. The ECtHR is more mindful, although many pertinent issues are still 
not sufficiently addressed. To summarise, the application of the principle of systemic 
integration should not be understood as the legal basis for aligning the meaning of a 
treaty with the content of other treaties. After all, human rights treaties establish a 
minimum standard for a selective catalogue of rights. In many instances, the ECtHR 
follows such an intensive integrative and harmonising interpretation of the ECHR with 
regard to other treaties that it raises questions about the boundary between interpreting 
and re-writing the ECHR. Mitigating fragmentation does not equate to striving for 
uniformity. International courts can and should justify different approaches and 
interpretations, if such decisions are dictated by different contexts.70 The ECtHR’s great 
receptiveness to other treaties is not always accompanied by a rigorous examination 
into how these treaties are relevant to the ECHR.  
Other international bodies pursue a more robust analysis of what a relevant rule 
of PIL is for the purposes of the treaty under interpretation. The Appellate Body of the 
WTO, in the Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft dispute, scrutinised in 
detail whether other international treaties related closely to the issues under dispute.71 
It found that the provisions of the 1992 Agreement between the EU and the USA 
concerning the application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft to trade 
in large civil aircraft were not relevant for the purpose of informing the meaning of 
‘benefit’ under Article 1.1(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures under discussion.72 The ICJ, in the Questions of Mutual Assistance case, 
																																								 																				
68 League of Arab States, Revised Arab Charter on Human Rights (adopted 22 May 2004; entered into 
force 15 March 2008) reprinted in 12 (2005) Int’l Hum. Rts. Rep. 893. 
69 Separate Opinion of Vice-President Fatsah Ouguergouz in Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and 
Human Rights Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v United Republic of Tanzania, ACtHPR 
App Nos 009 & 011/2011 (2013) [29]-[31]. 
70 Higgins (n 14) 799; Webb (n 2) 5. 
71 Report of the Appellate Body, WTO, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures 
Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, 18 May 2011 [845].  
72 ibid [846]-[855]. Also United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, 
Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R, 12 October 1998 [130]. 
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accepted that the 1977 Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between France and 
Djibouti was relevant and had ‘some bearing’ 73 on the interpretation of the 1986 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, although it did not elaborate 
further. There is, therefore, room for improvement, and international human rights 
courts should aim in this direction.  
 
 
C. Indirectly Applying and Supervising Other Treaties  
A concern when applying the principle of systemic integration (or Article 31 
(3)(c) VCLT with the objective of systemic integration in mind) is the risk of conflating 
the use of a treaty for the purpose of interpretation and the de facto application of that 
treaty.74 Systemic integration may lead not only to transposing detailed standards into 
the scope of a human rights treaty, but also to indirectly applying and supervising these 
standards under the pretext of interpretation. This, in turn, stretches – if not contravenes 
– the limited ratione materiae jurisdiction of an international human rights court.75 As 
will be discussed, both the IACtHR and the ECtHR discern a common denominator in 
the various relevant treaties by reading them together and subsequently integrate this 
denominator into the scope of the IACHR and the ECHR respectively. The ECtHR 
articulates its practice mostly in terms of a European consensus; the IACHR puts 
forward the international corpus juris, positing that a comprehensive and integrative 
reading of the IACHR alongside other treaties is justified on multiple grounds, 
including the pro homine principle, Article 29(b) IACHR and Article 31 (3)(c) VCLT.76 
The Taşkin and Tătar judgments marked a discernible shift in the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of the ECHR with respect to the use of other relevant treaties concerning 
environmental protection.77 The consideration of environment-related norms took the 
																																								 																				
73 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v France), Merits, Judgment, 4 
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form of fully integrating detailed obligations under the Aarhus Convention regarding 
access to information, public participation in decision-making and access to justice into 
the positive obligations of Article 8 ECHR. In effect, the Court provided for indirect 
procedural environmental rights and assessed member states’ acts and omissions 
against these standards.78 In a different series of cases concerning children’s rights, 
systemic integration, Article 31 (3) VCLT and the international corpus juris for the 
protection of the child served as the bases for the IACtHR to establish the content of 
Article 19 IACHR by incorporating provisions of the CRC.79 Although the Court 
proclaims that the CRC merely throws light on Article 19 IACHR, it does in fact 
integrate detailed requirements of the CRC.80  
Even more striking is the ECtHR’s practice regarding the Hague Convention on 
the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.81 Systemic integration provides the 
means for the Court to transplant technical provisions of the Hague Convention into 
Article 8 ECHR. In addition to this, the Court held that any weakening of the Hague 
Convention’s guarantees reduces the protection under the ECHR.82 National 
authorities’ failure to meet the six-week requirement to reach a decision on the 
expeditious return of the abducted child (Article 11 of the Hague Convention), or to 
diligently enforce this decision, automatically gives rise to a violation of Article 8 
ECHR.83 In this way, the Court effectively supervises the implementation of the Hague 
Convention under the guise of the ECHR.84 
																																								 																				
78 M Fitzmaurice, ‘Environmental Degradation’ in D Moeckli, S Shah and S Sivakumaran (eds), 
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‘Juvenile Reeducation Institute’ v Paraguay, IACtHR Series C 112 (2004) [148]. 
80 ‘Street Children’ [195], [196]; Gomez-Paquiyauri Brothers v Peru, IACtHR Series C 110 (2004) 
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82 Monory v Romania and Hungary, 5 April 2005 [81]. Also Bianchi v Switzerland, 22 June 2006 [92]; 
Carlson v Switzerland, 6 November 2008 [73]. 
83 Carlson [76]; Monory [81], [79], [85]; H.N. v Poland, 13 September 2005 [79]; Karadžić v Croatia, 
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e.g. H.N. [80]; Karadžić [60]-[61]; Maire v Portugal, 26 June 2003 [75]; Bianchi [98]; Lafargue v 
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International courts have gone so far as to pronounce on member states’ failures 
to honour and implement other treaties. In Carlson, Switzerland’s actions were ‘not in 
accordance with Article 11 of the Hague Convention’.85 In Fornerón and Daughter, the 
IACtHR found that the fact that Argentina did not specifically criminalise the sale of a 
child in its domestic law ‘does not satisfy the provision of Article 35 [CRC]’86 and is 
in dissonance with its obligations under the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prosecution and Child Pornography.87 
In Rantsev, the ECtHR found a procedural violation of the right to life because Cyprus 
had failed to make use of the procedures envisaged in a Mutual Legal Assistance 
Convention.88 The IACtHR decided that states were in violation of their obligation to 
prosecute and punish those responsible for serious human rights violations under the 
right to a fair trial and to judicial protection due to the lack of relevant extradition 
treaties.89 In other words, according to the Court, the IACHR specifically binds member 
states to conclude extradition agreements.  
Turning to another area, in Gonzales Lluy the IACtHR heard a case concerning 
the right to health.90 Notwithstanding the fact that the IACHR does not provide for the 
right to health and Article 26 IACHR is merely a commitment to progressive 
development rather than a recognition of socio-economic rights,91 the Court decided to 
uphold the right to health by linking it to the right to personal integrity (and the right to 
life). In particular, the Court read into the scope of the right to personal integrity the 
state’s obligation to regulate, monitor and supervise the services provided by private 
healthcare centres.92 This link was furnished in light of the interdependence and 
indivisibility of civil and political rights on the one hand and economic, social and 
cultural rights on the other –  and by taking into consideration a series of international 
treaties and documents, including the Additional Protocol to the American Convention 
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on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,93 the CRC and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).94 The 
ICESCR Committee’s General Comments articulating a detailed framework for the 
requirements of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality of all health 
services, goods and facilities qualified as the standard of assessment of Ecuador’s 
obligations under the IACHR.95 Although the Court was divided, the point of 
disagreement among the judges was the scope and nature of Article 26 IACHR and, 
accordingly, the question of whether the right to health should become justiciable under 
Article 26 or the rights to life and personal integrity.96 The President of the Court 
attached an insightful concurring opinion to the judgment, arguing that, if one were to 
define the entire content and scope of a right by means of other treaties, this would 
result in modifying the IACHR and delegitimising the Court.97 What was not addressed, 
however, was the question of why these concerns are not equally applicable when 
detailed soft-law and hard-law standards regarding the right to health are fully 
incorporated under the right to personal integrity. 
From the cases discussed, it follows that, although both the ECtHR and the 
IACtHR argue that other treaties (and instruments) are used as interpretative references 
in their reasoning, in practice they transplant external standards under the protective 
scope of their constitutive instruments. The specific application of systemic integration 
results, in many instances, in the indirect application of other treaties under the pretext 
of interpretation. States may provide different levels of protection for the same rights 
in different international treaties, or even strategically create treaty divergences or 
conflicts.98 This does not signify that international judges have the competence to 
resolve such issues, or to align the content of one treaty with another. In other cases, 
the Courts effectively supervise other treaties.99 This practice stretches their mandates 
and circumvents the consent of the states that have not ratified these treaties, by 
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imposing on them obligations that they have not assumed. Even in the scenario that 
member states (some or all of them) have ratified these treaties, they have not consented 
to the Courts supervising their implementation. Establishing the content and meaning 
of the rights provided for under the ECHR and the IACHR by reading into them, not 
only external detailed obligations, but also arguably new rights, crosses the line 
between interpreting and modifying human rights treaties.100 
 
 
III. SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION: FALLING SHORT OF 
EXPECTATIONS  
Having discussed certain doctrinal (interpretational and jurisdictional) issues 
that arise when applying systemic integration, this part of the article explores the 
broader implications of applying systemic integration within the human rights arena. 
Systemic integration falls short of international lawyers’ expectations for reasons which 
are rarely addressed. The first section highlights the fact that the application of the 
principle of systemic integration is subject to the institutional and policy preferences of 
international courts and, hence, there are inherent limitations to pursuing a uniform or 
consistent interpretation of human rights law. The second section discusses the 
argument that systemic integration has the potential to establish priorities among 
important concerns, rather than resolving treaty conflicts. The case law of the ECtHR 
reveals that when such an exercise takes place, it may upset the aims and structure of 
the treaty under interpretation. The third section questions the well-established 
presumption that the more receptive an international court is to other treaties, and the 
more systemically it integrates them in its reasoning, the more effectively it mitigates 
fragmentation.101 The analysis addresses the risk that international courts exercise 
undue interpretative authority over other treaties, thereby leading to the emergence of 
new informal hegemonies among international courts. The final section argues that 
systemic integration in the human rights regime may hinder the progressive 
development of other interests and concerns under PIL and cause our imaginative space 
to become stagnated, preventing us from looking beyond the human rights regime(s). 
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A. Systemic Integration is Shaped by Institutional Preferences  
The principle of systemic integration does not escape the functional biases and 
preferences of international courts. The application of systemic integration is subject to 
the legal and institutional aspects of fragmentation that it purports to overcome in the 
first place. Interpretation is, therefore, an invaluable – but limited – tool for 
international lawyers and judges. 
Debates in the literature usually revolve around the question of whether the 
introduction of relevant treaties in the process of interpretation could promote, for 
example, the receptiveness of an investment arbitration tribunal or a WTO Panel to 
human rights law and, hence, ground a holistic construal of different areas of law.102 
An interesting exercise that demonstrates the intrinsic difficulties involved is to adopt 
a narrower frame of reference and explore how international courts in the same area of 
law are restricted not only by the mandate defined by their subject area (e.g. human 
rights, trade) but also by their own judicial policies and preferences. Systemic 
integration as a policy goal and/or interpretation tool does not necessarily mitigate these 
preferences and biases, nor does it bring coherence to a specific area of PIL – let alone 
PIL as a whole.  
For instance, the IACtHR and the ECtHR are not equally willing to take 
indigenous peoples’ rights into account when interpreting the IACHR and the ECHR 
respectively. The IACtHR has enlarged the scope of Article 21 IACHR by reading into 
it a collective understanding of the right to property in accordance with Article 13 of 
ILO Convention No 169 regarding the duty of state parties to respect the special 
relationship that indigenous peoples develop with the lands that they occupy or use.103 
According to the Court, a comprehensive and integrative reading of the IACHR 
alongside other treaties is required in order to promote the uniform interpretation of 
international human rights law.104 This ‘effort of normative integration’105 serves the 
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aim of incorporating the indigenous world view into human rights.106 However, the 
ECtHR does not share the same degree of sympathy for indigenous peoples’ rights. In 
the Handölsdalen Sami Village case, the Court did not address how indigenous peoples’ 
rights and the relevant treaties could inform the ECHR’s interpretation.107 This point 
demonstrates not only the different approaches taken by the Courts, but also the 
selectiveness underlying the application of systemic integration. The IACtHR uses 
systemic integration and the pro homine interpretation to construe the corpus juris of 
international human rights law with the aim of serving specific judicial policy goals in 
the Latin American region.108 Consequently, any claim for a uniform interpretation of 
human rights or the use of integration is subject to (and even reinforces) existing biases 
and judicial policies. In addition, institutional preferences and structural biases 
permeate the human rights expertise from within, since human rights lawyers may 
regard themselves as experts in very specific areas (for example, children’s or anti-
discrimination lawyers) and, therefore, adopt opposing perspectives and priorities.109 
These preferences and biases on an institutional, judicial policy and expertise level are 
entrenched into the practice of human rights; at the very least, one should be aware of 
them.  
 
B. Prioritising Concerns Beyond Treaty Conflicts? 
The principle of systemic integration holds a prominent position  in discussions 
of treaty (or norm) conflicts. Although many scholars have acknowledged that Article 
31 (3)(c) VCLT is not equipped to resolve true treaty conflicts,110 the ILC assigns such 
a role to the provision in its alleged capacity as an expression of the principle of 
systemic integration. Furthermore, it has been argued that the principle of systemic 
integration offers the prospect of balancing different values and interests without 
necessarily predicating or establishing the prevalence of one norm over another.111 The 
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interpreter has a role in ‘prioritiz[ing] concerns that are more important at the cost of 
less important objectives’.112 These claims have not been elaborated on, but a few 
points need to be underlined in light of ongoing judicial practice. First, the task of 
balancing values or interests is different to prioritising them; prioritising is but one 
option. Second, as will be discussed below, it is doubtful whether the balancing of 
interests and values vis-à-vis treaty provisions can be addressed within the realm of 
interpretation.113 Third, it is unclear how one can decide which concerns are most 
important and prioritise them accordingly; this is an exercise that is dependent on the 
interpreter’s standpoint.  
For its part, the IACtHR does not seem inclined towards considering, let alone 
prioritising, interests and values reflected by other treaties unless these interests are 
perfectly aligned to the aims of the IACHR. To take an example, the Court was firm in 
its position that a bilateral investment treaty between Paraguay and Germany had no 
legal bearing in assessing whether a series of rights, including the right to property, of 
the Sawhoyamaxa community under the IACHR had been violated.114 In a similar vein, 
in the Wong Ho Wing v Peru case, the bilateral extradition treaty between Peru and 
China was largely treated as a fact under domestic law, rather than as an international 
treaty to be considered in the process of interpreting and applying the right to life under 
the IACHR.115 In other words, the general interest of international cooperation in the 
specific area of extradition did not have any bearing. Finally, in assessing the 
compatibility of El Salvador’s amnesty law with the IACHR, the Court stated that it 
would take the 1992 Peace Accord and Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (AP II) into account.116 In this instance, there seemed to be a discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, the requirement of the AP II to grant the broadest possible 
amnesties and the need to maintain the negotiated peace,117 and, on the other, the 
Court’s inflexible approach in declaring all amnesty laws to be incompatible with the 
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IACHR.118 The Court did not enter this discussion, and reiterated its general position – 
declaring El Salvador’s amnesty law inconsistent with the guarantees of the IACHR.119  
On the other side of the spectrum, the ECtHR is willing not only to balance 
external concerns and interests against the guarantees of the ECHR, but also to prioritise 
the former over the latter. In many instances, the ECtHR took other treaties (or the lack 
thereof) into account, but did not proceed to resolve (or avoid) a norm conflict. It 
arguably prioritised the admittedly weighty interests reflected by these treaties under 
PIL over the applicability and application of the ECHR. This had a significantly 
restrictive impact on the protective scope of the rights in question. In Carson, the Grand 
Chamber accepted that the absence of bilateral reciprocal treaties in the social security 
sphere is a sufficient reason to limit the applicability of Article 14 ECHR; otherwise, 
the application of Article 14 ECHR would effectively undermine the right of states to 
enter into reciprocal agreements.120 In Waite and Kennedy, the Plenary Court held that 
the right to access a court should be substantially restricted so as not to undermine the 
proper functioning of international organisations and international cooperation.121 In 
Bosphorus, the Court established the presumption of equivalent or comparable 
protection between EU law and the ECHR by relying upon the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda and the need for the proper functioning of international organisations 
(Ireland’s EU membership).122  
A cluster of cases concerning the Hague Convention on Child Abduction also 
illustrates that prioritising the purposes and goals of other treaties may interfere with 
the aims, structure and effectiveness of the ECHR. The applicants before the ECtHR 
claimed that returning the child pursuant to the Hague Convention would be in violation 
of the best interests of the child and the right to family life under Article 8 ECHR. The 
Court would not rigorously review whether the return of the child was in breach of the 
guarantees of Article 8 ECHR unless there was an arbitrary decision by national 
authorities.123 The crux of these cases was that Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention 
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envisages an exception to the state parties’ obligation to return the child if there is a 
grave risk that the child’s return would expose him or her to physical or psychological 
harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. The Court’s standing case 
law, to apply the Hague Convention’s provisions de facto via the ECHR,124 and the 
importance attached to preserving the main aim of the Convention (the expeditious 
return of the child) created the uncomfortable situation whereby the Court was obliged 
to review the Hague Convention against the ECHR.125 On the one hand, Article 13 (b) 
of the Hague Convention is an exceptional ‘escape clause’ to the return of the child, 
and has to be narrowly interpreted, whereas, on the other hand, the protection of the 
best interests and rights of the child serve as primary considerations under Article 8 
ECHR, which, in turn, may be subject to restrictions. The ECtHR was hesitant to review 
the application of the Hague Convention against the guarantees of Article 8 ECHR in 
light of the risk of undermining the effective implementation of the Hague 
Convention.126 The Grand Chamber, in Neulinger and Shuruk, restored this imbalance, 
ruling that the conditions for the enforcement of the return of the child need to be in 
strict conformity with Article 8 ECHR.127  
Consequently, the IACtHR and ECtHR have different approaches in this instance. 
The IACtHR appears to be fixed in its position of giving little weight to the values and 
interests of other treaties, unless these converge with the aims and effectiveness of the 
IACHR. Some scholars have argued that this practice can be rigid and one-sided on 
certain occasions, especially when discussing amnesty laws. The ECtHR employs 
systemic integration in order to justify the prioritisation of significant interests over the 
ECHR as an issue of legal methodology. The foregoing cases demonstrate that the 
argument that systemic integration is a means of balancing or even prioritising among 
other important interests can lead to significant restrictions of human rights guarantees.   
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C. Exercising Undue Interpretative Authority over Other Treaties 
An international court’s receptiveness to relevant PIL rules can be a reliable 
indicator of a reduced risk of diverging interpretations and/or judgments, as well as 
bolstering cross-fertilisation.128 At the same time, however, an international court’s 
systematic engagement with, and integration of, other treaties raises questions 
regarding its authority to shape the construal of these treaties. When an international 
court takes a treaty provision into account for interpretation purposes, it inevitably 
engages in an articulation of its ordinary meaning.129 While international courts have 
the inherent power to construe general international law, they do not have the 
competence to authoritatively ascertain the ordinary meaning of treaties other than the 
instruments subject to their jurisdiction.  
An exceptional instance is the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
Article 3 (1) of the Protocol establishing the ACtHPR provides that ‘[t]he jurisdiction 
of the Court shall extend to all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the 
interpretation and application of the Charter, this Protocol and any other relevant 
Human Rights instrument ratified by the States concerned’.130 Pursuant to this wide 
jurisdiction, the Court has indeed interpreted, applied and, accordingly, found a 
violation of, for example, the ICCPR131 or the Revised ECOWAS treaty.132 Yet, even 
in light of the exceptional scope of the ACtHPR’s competence, concerns regarding the 
potential for undue interpretative authority over other treaties are not mitigated. Such 
concerns relate, obviously, to the risk of divergent interpretations of a treaty which is 
already supervised by another body. The Vice-President of the ACtHPR underlined this 
risk in his separate opinion in the Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights 
Centre and Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v United Republic of Tanzania case.133 
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Nonetheless, these concerns are also manifested (and merit equal consideration) in 
instances in which a treaty is not subject to supervision by an international body and/or 
the interpretation of one of its provisions is contested or unclear.134 The WTO Appellate 
Body135 and international investment tribunals tend to engage only very reluctantly with 
the interpretation of other treaties.136 Human rights courts, however, show no signs of 
hesitance in this regard.  
The X and others case137 serves as a good example of a Grand Chamber divided 
over the ordinary meaning of the European Convention on the Adoption of Children.138 
Seven dissenting judges strongly opined that the majority’s interpretation adhered 
neither to the letter nor to the object and purpose of Article 7 of the said Convention.139 
Moreover, the ECtHR defines the ordinary meaning of debated provisions of the Hague 
Convention and corrects the (alleged) shortcomings of national courts’ decisions when 
applying the Hague Convention.140 Judge Pinto De Albuquerque argued that, in the 
absence of an oversight body for the Hague Convention, the ECtHR should ensure the 
uniformity of the interpretation and implementation of states’ obligations under the 
Hague Convention.141 The IACtHR, in Artavia Murillo, engaged extensively with many 
human rights treaties and it is arguable that in the process of doing so it pursued an 
inappropriate interpretation of the CRC and the ICCPR.142 The Court read and adopted 
a specific interpretation of the right to life under these treaties that does not necessarily 
reflect their ordinary meaning or the current views of their supervisory bodies.143 Such 
instances may be somewhat exceptional (thus far) but they are arguably symptomatic 
of future trends.144 The questions that come to the surface, but are rarely discussed in 
literature and judicial practice, are the following: Are international courts entitled to 
have a say on the interpretation of other treaties? If so, what are the implications for the 
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development of international law, and what is the role that these courts assume?  
In general, all international courts are equal participants in the development of 
PIL, including general international law (international customary law and general 
principles of law) and treaties.145 As far as treaties are concerned, international courts 
frequently refer to and use them as interpretative aids. When doing so, they make sure 
to approach the authoritative meaning of a treaty provision by relying on how its 
interpretation has been developed by the respective supervisory body. If a treaty lacks 
a monitoring body, it is the state parties to this treaty that ascribe authoritative 
interpretations. Yet, it would be unreasonable to question altogether the authority of 
international courts and bodies to interpret another treaty, should such an issue arise 
when deciding a case. Their interpretations may not be authoritative, but they do enjoy 
a certain authority.146  
The weight of this authority is determined by how an international court 
ascertains the ordinary meaning of a treaty provision. In the Hague Abduction cases 
discussed above, the only source that the ECtHR employed as an interpretative aid to 
support its findings was the 1980 Explanatory Report on the Hague Convention.147 It is 
only after the use of the Hague Convention became contested that the Court employed 
additional and more recent resources to interpret the Hague Convention.148 Although 
the practice of national authorities (primarily courts) of member states to the Hague 
Convention is critical in the sense that it is genuinely authoritative, the ECtHR is not 
rigorous in identifying and analysing such practice.149 The ECtHR in Monory invoked 
the practice of European states, although the treaty is widely ratified on a global level 
by 94 states150 and, if one reads through the references in Monory, the Court essentially 
cites the practice of one European state! In Neulinger and Shuruk, the ECtHR looked 
selectively into the practice of certain European and Australian domestic courts.151 
Conversely, the weight of the authority of an interpretation by the ECtHR will 
subsequently be tested against the practice of member states with respect to this other 
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treaty. This means that, for instance, the ECHR member states can, in theory, dismiss 
the ECtHR’s findings (as to the interpretation of the Hague Convention); this, however, 
would put them in a difficult position since they have to conform to the Court’s 
judgments.  
The increasing receptiveness of an international court to relevant treaties, if 
accompanied by an integrative interpretation, raises questions not only on the level of 
interpretation but also regarding the role that the court assumes in asserting authority 
over other treaties.156 There is the risk of establishing novel, informal hierarchies among 
international courts on the basis of who exercises and concentrates persuasive 
interpretative and normative power when construing certain treaties. One could not fail 
to note that the fragmentation discussion has unfolded as a critique against (or in favour 
of) sustaining formal or informal hierarchies among international courts. The 
perception that the multiplicity of international courts poses a danger to the unity of 
PIL partly reflects the hegemonic conflict stemming from the ‘loss of hierarchical 
position by institutions of the ancient régime’157 (referring mostly to the role of the 
International Court of Justice). In this context, other international courts are not exempt 
from the same note of caution. Why should one presume that the ECtHR or the IACtHR 
are immune to establishing new forms of informal hegemonies?158 It is important to be 
mindful that shared ownership over international law goes hand in hand with the burden 
of shared responsibility for developing international law and managing international 
dispute settlement.159 Shared responsibility is not restricted to drafting treaty clauses 
for regulating overlapping jurisdiction, applying procedural principles or exercising 
judicial comity.160 In the everyday operation of international courts, international 
lawyers and judges need to be aware of the systemic implications of their judgments in 
order to avoid exercising undue authority over other treaties. Creativity does not 
preclude prudence. International courts should conduct more rigorous research on a 
comparative and international level, and they should enhance the quality of judicial 
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reasoning and methodology, especially when interpreting a treaty that does not fall 
within their jurisdiction.161 
Finally, an argument that is often raised is that certain international courts may 
present the only viable opportunity to meaningfully develop a given international treaty 
which lacks an implementation mechanism. The IACtHR used this reasoning as a basis 
not only for taking other treaties into account, but also for exercising jurisdiction over 
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture,162 despite the fact that 
it is unclear whether this Convention assigns this task to the Court.163 Although such 
an argument could be somewhat understandable given the shortcomings of the 
international judicial system, it is tenuous for two reasons.166 First, this argument 
disregards the pivotal role that domestic courts can play in the determination and 
development of international law and treaties. National courts serve the role of 
providing accessible justice on a daily basis.167 There is evidence to indicate that 
domestic courts increasingly engage with questions of international law, employ 
complex interpretative principles (including systemic integration) and come up with 
original decisions.168 This is not to say that innovative approaches in international 
litigation are not needed. Rather, the point is that we should not wait for domestic 
remedies to be exhausted in order to pursue international justice.169 We should treat the 
national judge as an agent of international justice as well. This is all the more pertinent 
since the national judge is in a unique position to apply the principle of systemic 
integration without being confined by the limited jurisdiction of an international 
court.170  
The second reason that the systematic and integrative approach of international 
courts towards other treaties is problematic is its repercussions for their legitimacy and 
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the overall effectiveness of human rights.171 There are growing concerns among 
member states to the ECHR regarding the ECtHR’s practice of uncritically applying 
the principle of systemic integration. The lack of transparent legal reasoning and 
foreseeability in the case law, as well as the states’ unwillingness to transform, de facto, 
the ECtHR into a supervisory mechanism for other treaty obligations, have led to a 
series of incongruous preliminary objections ratione materiae. Moldova, in Tănase, 
strongly argued that the Court should not have used the European Convention on 
Nationality172 in order to construe the ECHR, and that the weight attached to the said 
Convention was inappropriate.173 Turkey, in Demir and Baykara, objected to the 
integration of ILO conventions under the scope of Article 11 ECHR.174 Similarly, the 
United Kingdom, in National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers, opposed 
the interpretative relevance of the legal assessments of the European Committee on 
Social Rights and the ILO Committee of Experts to the interpretation of Article 11 
ECHR.175 From the other side of the Atlantic, member states to the IACHR have also 
started to show signs of unease. Paraguay, in the ‘Juvenile Reeducation Institute’ case, 
contested the idea that socio-economic rights can be read into the scope of Article 26 
IACHR.176 In Acevedo Buendía, Peru raised a preliminary objection arguing that an 
alleged violation of the right to social security falls outside the Court’s competence.177 
Against this background, the current president of the IACtHR and various scholars 
caution that the IACtHR’s practice of strongly pursuing a pro homime interpretation of 
the IACHR by applying systemic integration will delegitimise the Court and undermine 
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D. Does Systemic Integration in the Human Rights Regime Limit the 
Potential of International Law? 
The role that international courts assume and their perception of the 
interpretation task are significant to the development of PIL. Georges Abi-Saab’s 
metaphor of international law as a parasitic plant that grows erratically by seizing on 
all opportunities and latching onto anything that offers the possibility of moving 
towards the light179 makes one quick to ascribe only weaknesses to the development of 
PIL and disregard the qualities of diversity and the richness encapsulated precisely in 
the absence of a centralised legislative and judicial authority. PIL, despite its 
sophistication, widening and thickening in recent years, holds more firmly than ever to 
its archaic tendency to grow erratically. In an effort to look into PIL in an orderly way 
– with a vision and a goal to bring together and integrate all the disparate elements of 
the system into a single coherent story – international courts should be mindful of the 
unintended implications. The uncritical application of the principle of systemic 
integration, especially in the context of (and by) international human rights law, may 
narrow the existing and potential reach of PIL by reducing various concerns and 
interests to the human rights paradigm.  
An exemplary case concerns the integration of environmental norms into the 
scope of the ECHR, which brought about the long-awaited integration of environmental 
concerns into the human rights discourse.180 This is, in principle, a positive 
development. Few note, however, the now-prevailing individualistic perspective 
towards the environment, and fewer still recognise that the concept of the environment 
as a public good, indispensable for the life and welfare of society as a whole, is being 
reduced to a restricted set of individual rights of a procedural character.181 Neither the 
European nor the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights addresses the ecological 
approach to the environment, nor do they appreciate environmental integrity and 
degradation as values for the community per se.182 This narrow approach has important 
legal consequences: environmental damage can only be translated into the violation of 
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a human right;183 the victim requirement as an admissibility condition before 
international courts is not informed by the collective dimension of environmental 
integrity; and assessment of environmental regulations introduced by states is confined 
to the potential limitations to human rights.184 It could be argued that other regimes and 
approaches mitigate the shortcomings entrenched in human rights discourse and 
practice. Yet such an argument disregards the fact that the practice of international 
human rights courts and bodies is disproportionately influential and, hence, it is highly 
likely that the ‘narrowest but strongest argument for a human right to the 
environment’185 will survive and become mainstreamed into the future development of 
international law, hindering its potential evolution in different directions.186  
Similar considerations apply to other areas and concerns under PIL. It is unclear 
to what extent human rights treaties – even in light of the integrative and ground-
breaking jurisprudence of the IACtHR – are structurally equipped to include and 
articulate indigenous understandings of ownership.187 It is clear that the IACtHR has 
not acknowledged indigenous people, as a collective group, as the right-holders under 
the IACHR, but rather as individual members of the community.188 Neither does the 
systemic integration approach of the IACtHR give due regard to the potential of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.189 The IACtHR made a choice – one 
that was never acknowledged – between the ILO Conventions and the UN Declaration, 
which sets more demanding standards, more difficult to reconcile with those of the 
IACHR.190 Equally concerning is the integration of socio-economic rights into the 
discourse of civil and political human rights, insofar as we might question whether it is 
reasonable to expect that the imbalance of power in labour relations and in the complex 
area of social rights can and should be mediated through the ECHR or the IACHR. In 
the same vein, the language of human rights is (to some extent) ill suited to describe 
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how corruption causes harm to socio-economic rights,191 or to acknowledge the effects 
of systemic discrimination and stigmatisation.192 In addition, despite the significant 
contribution of human rights courts and bodies to the recognition of domestic violence 
as a human rights issue, there are limits to how far human rights law can go to protect 
individuals from violations occurring in the private sphere.193 Another topical question 
is whether international human rights law is capable of articulating and remedying the 
contemporary refugee crisis.194 And then there is the issue of protecting human rights 
online. International human rights law is currently attempting to grasp the concerns 
pertinent in the digital environment in legal form.195 To what extent, however, will the 
human rights paradigm recognise the complex and distinctive interrelation of 
network/national/individual security and privacy online? In the online environment, 
privacy and aspects of security can be in both a symbiotic and an antithetical 
relationship,196 and privacy can be a strong prerequisite for exercising freedom of 
expression. Nonetheless, according to the structure of human rights law, it is not 
possible to protect privacy and freedom of expression at the same time; instead, one 
can only be assessed as a legitimate restriction on the other. How will this dynamic 
relationship be incorporated into, and inform, legal reasoning and the proportionality 
test?197  
The foregoing points do not aim to understate the relevance and significance of 
the human rights approach to other interests and concerns. Pursuing systemic integration 
within the human rights arena may lead to progressive developments in PIL and enrich 
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the human rights discourse while adding value to, and highlighting, new interests. 
However, one should question whether we should settle for the strongest arguments, 
which in practice seem to be the easiest arguments to make. Human rights are 
simultaneously part of the solution and the problem; its well-established and powerful 
– doctrinal and rhetorical – vocabulary dominates the imaginative scope of international 
law and overshadows other articulations.198 In this context, the principle of systemic 
integration arguably tends to accelerate and intensify this process: the human rights 
paradigm does not only overshadow but also subsumes other emerging areas of, and 
concerns in, law by “squeezing” them into its own vocabulary, aims, structure and 
scope. Aspects of these interests that are not readily reducible to human rights needs 
remain embryonic or fall between the cracks.199 In this sense, international law’s store 
of available words and possible future meanings is being constrained and 
impoverished.200 Progress and stagnation stand on opposite sides of a very fine line:201 
mitigating fragmentation and ensuring consistency should not impede the progressive 
development of PIL in pursuit of more radical and imaginative changes, even if this 
means that the available narratives become less coherent.  
It needs to be underscored that this is a process familiar in many quarters of 
international law and practice: other areas and regimes may raise similar questions when 
engaging with other treaties and concerns. It is also true that, in general, human rights 
law shapes and, in turn, is shaped by other fields and norms in a dynamic and non-linear 
fashion.202 The present discussion, however, shifts the debate from the conventional 
focus on interactions among well-known regimes (or the interactions of regimes vis-à-
vis general international law) to how the human rights paradigm develops and/or inhibits 
the legal articulation of numerous other interests under PIL. Applying systemic 
integration arguably has a unique net effect in the human rights area for a number of 
reasons: in contrast to other international institutions, human rights courts and bodies 
are increasingly receptive towards the interpretative technique of systemic 
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integration;203 moreover, as discussed earlier, human rights is a persuasive and 
appealing discourse that can monopolise our attention; and, finally, judgments by 
prominent human rights courts are particularly influential and contain the promise of 
enforcement, especially vis-à-vis norms and treaties that lack monitoring 
mechanisms.204  
To conclude, the consideration and possible incorporation of other interests 
under PIL into human rights and the role of systemic integration as an interpretation 
tool must not become our comfort zone. On the one hand, human rights bodies should 
acknowledge, engage with and integrate other concerns into their interpretation. On the 
other hand, and to the extent that the human rights structure and its conceptual tools fail 
to accommodate other concerns, we should continue exploring what is legally possible 
and acceptable for the international legal community.205 This could involve forging 
different norm interactions and synergies, looking into different international fora and 
enquiring into other approaches. One way forward could be to move in the direction of 
setting up more monitoring mechanisms and/or international judicialisation. In this 
way, various interests in international society would be evenly represented and more 
diverse approaches could be on the table. Yet, even if it is to be assumed that states 
would give their consent to establishing these mechanisms, international supervision 
(of a judicial nature or otherwise) in itself does not necessarily guarantee that we will 
respond effectively to emerging and complex questions. Human rights and international 
law expertise need to be creative in construing the law and mindful of their limitations. 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS  
This article has argued that systemic integration is neither the ultimate answer 
to difficulties arising from the fragmentation of PIL nor a problem-free interpretative 
technique. Legal interpretation alleviates certain difficulties presented by fragmentation 
but it cannot resolve the need for international courts to do away with their fragmented 
lens and “piecemeal” decision-making. One might also assume that applying systemic 
integration within one functional regime – the human rights regime – would present 
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fewer challenges vis-à-vis applying systemic integration across different regimes. The 
analysis provided evidence demonstrating that this is not the case. In fact, it is perhaps 
a greater challenge to identify subtle contextual differences between treaties stemming 
from the human rights regime or to preserve the aims and specificity of the ECHR, the 
IACHR or the ACHPR vis-à-vis other treaties. 
The application of systemic integration (or Article 31 (3)(c) with the goal of 
systemic integration in mind) should not be understood as the legal basis upon which 
to align the content of a treaty with the content of other treaties. Ensuring consistency 
and cross-fertilisation requires due appreciation of the contextual nuances in different 
treaties. In the current practice of the ECtHR and the IACtHR, we also encounter cases 
in which the Courts indirectly apply and supervise other treaties under the guise of 
systemic integration. Such instances seriously call into question the Courts’ 
jurisdictional confines and mandates, if indeed they do not exceed them. The critical 
analysis in this article should not be seen as a call for textualism or a reduction in 
creativity. It is rather a call to be creative while striving for more rigorous methodology 
and transparency in legal reasoning and judgments. Legal reasoning is not merely a 
matter of rigid legal technique but encapsulates the delicate balance between, on the 
one hand, employing other treaties to interpret a treaty and, on the other hand, knowing 
where the limits to the exercise of interpretation lie.  
Most importantly, this article has stressed that we should be aware of the 
(unintentional) ramifications of pursuing systemic integration or systemic integration-
like interpretative exercises in the human rights area. A court’s systematic engagement 
with other treaties, especially when those treaties lack a monitoring mechanism, may 
lead the exercise of undue interpretative authority over treaty provisions that are 
contested or unclear. Moreover, systemic integration does not always benefit the 
diversity of PIL or the development of other bodies of law. Providing the opportunity 
for other areas of PIL to reach their potential, addressing pressing global issues via 
different avenues or even acknowledging that human rights law cannot mitigate the 
prevalent policy incoherence in international law-making are viable alternatives to 
merely reducing various concerns to the human rights regime. These concerns are not 
frequently raised, notwithstanding the fact that international human rights courts have 
made important contributions to progressively developing both their own treaty 
regimes and other interests under PIL. Yet there remains a real risk that human rights 
practice and discourse will monopolise and subsume some of these interests.  
